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TOTALLY CLASS-LESS?:  
EXAMINING BRISTOL-MYERS’S 
APPLICABILITY TO CLASS ACTIONS 
Justin A. Stone* 
 
In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court tightened the specific jurisdiction 
doctrine when it dismissed several plaintiffs’ claims in a mass tort action 
against pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  The action was brought in a California state court and 
involved several hundred plaintiffs alleging that they were injured by Plavix, 
a drug BMS manufactures.  The Supreme Court held that California could 
not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over BMS as to the 
nonresident plaintiffs, who did not have an independent connection to 
California.  While the nonresident plaintiffs argued that California had 
specific jurisdiction because their claims were identical to the California 
residents’ claims (with the only difference being that their experience with 
Plavix occurred in other states), the Court held that these claims did not arise 
out of BMS’s contacts with California, but rather out of BMS’s contacts with 
the particular states in which these plaintiffs were injured.  In so holding, the 
Court emphasized that enabling California to exercise jurisdiction in this 
context would infringe on the sovereignty of other states—more specifically, 
the states who housed the nonresident plaintiffs involved in the action.  This 
Note explores whether class actions should be bound by this decision.  The 
fundamental question, then, is whether class actions are meaningfully 
distinguishable from mass tort actions such that they avoid Bristol-Myers’s 
reach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate defendants recently obtained a huge win in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but the scope of the victory remains unclear.  On June 19, 2017, in an 
8–1 decision, the Court held that the state of California lacked jurisdiction 
over the nonresident plaintiffs involved in a mass tort lawsuit.1  Brought in a 
California state court against the pharmaceutical behemoth Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (BMS), the case involved hundreds of plaintiffs alleging that the 
BMS drug Plavix had damaged their health.2  BMS filed a motion to dismiss 
the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the plaintiffs who had no 
connection to California.  Reversing the Supreme Court of California, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, ruled in favor 
of BMS.  The Court held that—although the nonresident plaintiffs brought 
identical claims to those plaintiffs who were prescribed the drug in 
California, ingested the drug in California, and were injured by the drug in 
California—California could not constitutionally exercise territorial 
jurisdiction over them.3  In so holding, the Court left open the question at the 
center of this Note:  whether, in class action lawsuits, personal jurisdiction 
exists for members of the class that have no connection to the forum state in 
which the action is brought. 
Part I of this Note first describes the landscape of personal jurisdiction and, 
more specifically, the landscape as it relates to corporations.  It then examines 
more closely the Bristol-Myers opinion itself by scrutinizing the purported 
reasoning behind the Court’s decision, explaining how the decision alters the 
personal jurisdiction landscape, and surveying the law concerning the 
relationship between personal jurisdiction and class actions prior to the 
decision.  Finally, it briefly defines the different types of class actions and 
compares them to the mass actions of the sort involved in Bristol-Myers. 
Part II examines eight recent decisions that analyze the applicability of 
Bristol-Myers to class actions.  This Part exemplifies the disparate 
approaches courts have used in applying Bristol-Myers to the class action 
context.  Part III concludes that Bristol-Myers should not be extended to class 
actions as they are meaningfully distinguishable from the type of action 
brought in Bristol-Myers. 
 
 1. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1781. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction Before and After Bristol-Myers 
Personal jurisdiction is guided by the Due Process Clause found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits a state from 
exercising jurisdiction over a defendant if such an exercise would 
inappropriately exceed the reach of that state’s sovereignty.4  There are two 
types of power through which a state can exercise personal jurisdiction over 
an individual:  general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.5  If a state has 
general jurisdiction over an individual, that individual can be sued in that 
state regardless of the specific claim at hand.6  If a state has only specific 
jurisdiction over an individual, that individual can be sued in that state only 
if her contacts with the state give rise to the individual’s specific claim at 
hand.7  Personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, can be 
waived by consent.8  Plaintiffs consent to personal jurisdiction when they 
sue.9  Defendants can consent either through an affirmative statement of 
consent or by proceeding with the actions against them without objecting to 
jurisdiction.10 
As every first-year law student at some point discovers, the current state 
of the personal jurisdiction doctrine was first established in the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision, International Shoe Co. v. Washington.11  In 
response to the increasing corporate population, the Court provided the 
following oft-quoted guideline: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, 
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”12 
International Shoe also drew a distinction between two types of personal 
jurisdiction—a dichotomy that laid the foundation for the doctrines of 
general and specific jurisdiction.13  In a more eloquent diction, the Court 
explicitly acknowledged that a defendant may be subject to suit in a particular 
forum either because (1) the defendant had such substantial contacts with the 
forum that the defendant could be sued there, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff’s claim relates to those contacts; or (2) the defendant’s contacts with 
 
 4. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945). 
 5. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). 
 9. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 (stating that “an individual may submit to 
the jurisdiction of the court by appearance”). 
 10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B). 
 11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 12. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 13. Id. at 318. 
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the forum state, irrespective of substantiality, gave rise to the plaintiff’s 
claim.14 
Following International Shoe, the extent to which plaintiffs could forum 
shop by arguing that a corporate defendant is subject to general jurisdiction 
in every state in which it conducts substantial business operations remained 
unclear.15  Over the last few years, however, the Court has narrowed the 
doctrine of general jurisdiction tremendously, at least insofar as it relates to 
corporate defendants.16  In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown,17 the Court made clear that a state may not assert general jurisdiction 
over the foreign subsidiaries of a corporation simply by virtue of the latter 
being subject to such jurisdiction.18  In Daimler AG v. Bauman,19 the Court 
narrowed the doctrine further when it indicated that a state may exercise 
general jurisdiction over a corporation only if the corporation (1) is 
incorporated in the state attempting to exercise general jurisdiction, or (2) has 
established its principal place of business in the state attempting to exercise 
general jurisdiction.20  The Court did not completely limit the exercise of 
general jurisdiction to these two options and acknowledged that there may be 
extraordinary circumstances in which a state could assert general jurisdiction 
over a corporation that is neither incorporated nor headquartered there.21  
However, since Daimler, no such circumstance has arisen, and no state has 
successfully exercised general jurisdiction over a corporation unless one of 
those two conditions was satisfied. 
Accordingly, Bristol-Myers analyzed the California court’s exercise of 
specific personal jurisdiction over BMS since, after Daimler, California had 
no claim to general jurisdiction despite BMS’s substantial contacts with the 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the 
National Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1356–57 (2005) 
(noting that, in 2005, “[l]ower courts and scholars have not reached a consensus as to the 
number and type of contacts necessary to establish general jurisdiction over unrelated 
claims”).  Compare Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418–
19 (1984) (holding that Texas could not assert general jurisdiction over the defendant despite 
the defendant’s substantial business contacts with the state), with Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 
320, 330 (1980) (stating, in dicta, that Minnesota and every other state could assert general 
jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of the defendant having conducted business in all 
fifty states). 
 16. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 17. 564 U.S. 915. 
 18. See id. at 919–20. 
 19. 134 S. Ct. 746. 
 20. Id. at 760.  The “principal place of business” is a corporation’s headquarters. See Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92 (2010). 
 21. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.  The Court said this with Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) in mind.  In Perkins, the Court held that Ohio could properly 
assert general jurisdiction over the defendant-corporation, which was neither headquartered 
nor incorporated in Ohio, because the defendant had, due to World War II, temporarily moved 
all of its business operations to Ohio. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448. 
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state.22  To assert specific jurisdiction, as the doctrine stands today, a plaintiff 
must satisfy three prongs by showing that (1) the defendant has purposefully 
availed itself of the forum state; (2) the plaintiff’s claim or claims arise out 
of or relate to such contacts with the state (i.e., arise out of such purposeful 
availment); and (3) it would be reasonable for the forum state to exercise 
jurisdiction in the case at hand.23 
In Bristol-Myers, neither the Court nor BMS contested that BMS had 
purposefully availed itself of the California market.24  Not only did BMS 
have a laboratory in California, it marketed Plavix to the California 
population and generated over $900 million from California sales of Plavix 
at the time of the case.25  Further, neither the Court nor BMS contested 
jurisdiction as to the California plaintiffs.26  However, the Court did dismiss 
the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction.27 
The Bristol-Myers action was brought by 678 plaintiffs, 592 of whom were 
not residents of California.28  The Court reasoned that the non-Californians’ 
claims neither related to nor arose out of BMS’s contacts with California 
because, unlike the California plaintiffs, these plaintiffs were never 
prescribed Plavix in California; never ingested Plavix in California; and were 
never injured by Plavix in California.  Nor did BMS conduct research on, or 
develop, the drug in California.29  The plaintiffs’ assertion that their claims 
did relate to BMS’s contacts with California was centered on the fact that 
their claims were identical to those brought by the California plaintiffs—the 
only difference, of course, being that their experience with Plavix occurred 
in states other than California.30  Thus, the Court answered a question it had 
never before answered concretely and determined that, when assessing 
whether a court has territorial jurisdiction in a mass tort action, the court must 
examine each plaintiff’s claim individually.  Consequently, just three years 
after tightening the requirements for general jurisdiction, the Court doubled 
down with a more stringent analysis of specific jurisdiction.  The extent to 
which the specific jurisdiction doctrine has been narrowed for class actions, 
however, is yet to be determined.  As Justice Sotomayor, the lone dissenter 
 
 22. Interestingly, the California Court of Appeal initially upheld jurisdiction under a 
theory of general jurisdiction, but subsequently amended its position to a theory of specific 
jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017). 
 23. Id. at 1785–86 (“Our cases have set out three conditions for the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”). 
 24. Id. at 1786. 
 25. Id. at 1778. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1781. 
 30. Id.  The plaintiffs also argued that California could exercise specific jurisdiction 
because BMS had a contract with a California distributor to distribute Plavix nationwide.  The 
Court rejected this argument. Id. at 1783.  While illustrative of the Court’s narrow approach 
to specific jurisdiction, that argument is not relevant for the purposes of this Note. 
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in Bristol-Myers, emphasized, whether the Court’s holding extends to class 
actions remains to be seen.31 
Interestingly, while the Court’s clear recognition of the plaintiffs’ failure 
to satisfy the second prong appeared sufficient to overturn the California 
court, the Court continued with what appeared to be a reasonableness (or 
third prong) analysis.32  The Court understood that in terms of efficiency and 
convenience—factors often considered in a reasonableness inquiry—
dismissing these claims would be counterproductive since it would spawn 
several lawsuits around the country as opposed to resolving the claims with 
a single lawsuit.33  However, the Court focused on what it believed was a 
more pressing concern: 
Assessing [the] burden on [the defendant in litigating in a certain forum] 
obviously requires a court to consider the practical problems resulting from 
litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses the more abstract matter of 
submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate 
interest in the claims in question.  As we have put it, restrictions on personal 
jurisdiction “are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or 
distant litigation.  They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States.”34 
“‘The sovereignty of each State,’” the Court continued, “‘implie[s] a 
limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States.’  And at times, this 
federalism interest may be decisive.”35  The Court concluded that this 
“federalism interest” cannot be overcome by the forum state’s interest in 
asserting its power over the particular defendant, or by the convenience or 
efficiency that would result if such jurisdiction was allowed—lest the Due 
Process Clause be violated.36 
B.  Class Actions 
In arguing that the Court should exercise jurisdiction over BMS, California 
pointed to the Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,37 which 
proceeded through a money-damage class action.38  Shutts is an important 
case because it represents the only time the Supreme Court focused on this 
relationship between personal jurisdiction and class actions.  In that case, the 
defendant, Phillips Petroleum (“Phillips”), argued that the Court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident class members who had no 
 
 31. See id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court today does not confront 
the question whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff 
injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom 
were injured there.”). 
 32. Actually, the Court did not explicitly separate its analysis into three prongs, but its 
analysis does follow the typical trajectory of this multipronged approach.  Justice Sotomayor 
did break her analysis down into the three prongs in her dissent. Id. at 1785–86. 
 33. See id. at 1780 (majority opinion). 
 34. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 
 35. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 36. See id. 
 37. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 38. See id. at 801. 
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connection to Kansas, the forum state.39  Although initiating an action 
constitutes consenting to personal jurisdiction, Phillips argued that the 
nonresident, unnamed class members could not be said to have consented 
since they had a minimal role in bringing the suit.40  Indeed, many members 
of the class probably did not even realize they were part of an action against 
Phillips, as they were only given an opportunity to opt out rather than an 
opportunity to affirmatively opt into the action.41  In dismissing Phillips’s 
objection, the Court explained that the traditional personal jurisdiction due 
process analysis that applies to defendants does not apply to plaintiffs.42  
However, the Court made clear that in money-damage class actions such as 
this one, to avoid due process issues the unnamed class members must 
receive notice of the suit, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to 
affirmatively opt out of the class.43 
The Bristol-Myers Court, though, rejected California’s reliance on Shutts, 
emphasizing that Shutts involved a decision regarding the “due process rights 
of plaintiffs.”44  The case in front of it, on the other hand, implicated the 
traditional “minimum contacts” analysis used to consider territorial 
jurisdiction over defendants. 
A class action is “a form of representative litigation” in which “[o]ne or 
more class representatives litigate on behalf of many absent class members, 
and those class members are bound by the outcome of the representative’s 
litigation.”45  As such, class actions are the exception to the due process 
notion that an individual cannot be bound by a decision to which she is not a 
named party.46  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the class action 
certification process in federal court.47  Rule 23(a) dictates the following 
prerequisites that need to be satisfied to obtain certification: 
(1) the class [must be] so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there [must be] questions of law or fact common to the 
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be] 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative 
parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.48 
 
 39. Id. at 802–04. 
 40. Id. at 806. 
 41. Id. at 801. 
 42. Id. at 808. 
 43. Id. at 811–12. 
 44. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017). 
 45. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (5th ed. 2011). 
 46. See id. 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  For purposes of this Note, I will use Rule 23 to give the background 
of class actions.  The Class Action Fairness Act dramatically relaxed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s 
diversity requirement vis-à-vis class actions and enabled defendants to remove any state class 
action to federal court as long as “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State 
different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2012).  However, it should be 
noted that, although many states do not distinguish between different class action categories, 
the following analysis can likely be applied to many state court class actions as well. 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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Rule 23 recognizes four types of class actions—a crucial delineation for 
purposes of this Note.49  There are two types contemplated in 23(b)(1), one 
in 23(b)(2), and one in 23(b)(3).50  The first type of class action is governed 
by 23(b)(1)(A) and is used when prosecution of “separate actions by or 
against individual members of the class would create a risk of incompatible 
standards of conduct for the adverse party due to inconsistent or varying 
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class.”51  This 
category is rarely used and generally does not cover class action suits that 
seek money damages.52  Rather, it is for those situations in which 
contradictory adjudicatory outcomes in individual cases would leave the 
defendant unsure of how to act.53  For example, if the holders of a bond sued 
to have the bond deemed invalid, and some won and some lost, the defendant 
would not know the status of his obligations.54  This category of class action 
is sensibly referred to as an “incompatible-standards” class action.55 
The next type of class action is governed by 23(b)(1)(B), which states that 
a class action may be maintained . . . if:  prosecuting separate actions by or 
against individual class members would create a risk of . . . adjudications 
with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would 
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests.56 
The paradigmatic example of this category occurs when numerous people are 
likely to sue a defendant individually, but the defendant’s funds are likely 
insufficient to satisfy all judgments against it.57  A class action under this 
category ensures fairness by awarding each member of the class a pro rata 
share of the defendant’s available funds.58  This type of class action is 
appropriately termed the “limited-fund” class action.59 
Rule 23(b)(2), which dictates the third type of class action, permits a class 
action if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.”60  Money damages are generally not available in this category.61  
This is typically used when a group of people is seeking structural injunctive 
 
 49. Id. r. 23(b). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. r. 23(b)(1)(A); see also 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1. 
 52. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 57. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 61. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 
338, 365–67 (2011). 
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relief, or some other form of relief that is not monetary.62  This category of 
class action is commonly referred to as an “injunctive” class action.  It is 
frequently employed in the field of civil rights and, accordingly, is also often 
referred to as a “civil rights” class action.63 
The final class action category is found in 23(b)(3), which permits a class 
action if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”64  To sufficiently satisfy 
the predominance requirement needed to get a 23(b)(3) class certified, the 
class must demonstrate that individualized issues of law or fact will not 
predominate at trial.65  To satisfy the superiority requirement, the class must 
show that representative litigation presents a superior form of litigation than 
potential alternatives—such as proceeding through several individual actions 
or proceeding through the joinder mechanism (where all parties are named in 
the lawsuit).66  This category is often referred to as the “money-damage” 
class action.67  It is thus labeled because it is the class action most frequently 
employed when seeking money damages.68  Naturally, the money-damage 
class action is a category for which certification is frequently sought. 
As for opt-out and notice rights in class actions, they are only mandatory 
in money-damage class actions.69  Providing notice to unnamed class 
members in 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions is discretionary because, as 
explained later, constitutional due process concerns are not as prevalent in 
these class action types.70  In addition, class members in 23(b)(1) and 
23(b)(2) actions often do not have the option to opt out of the class, as is also 
explained more thoroughly below.71 
There are four central objectives of the class action.72  They can be 
described in terms of compensation, deterrence, efficiency, and legitimacy.73  
Class actions are effectively the only way individuals with claims for small 
amounts of money can seek redress in court.74  People with such claims will 
not find pursuing individual actions worth their time, as the legal fees would 
almost assuredly exceed the amount that could be recovered in court.75  
 
 62. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:1. 
 63. See id. 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 65. See, e.g., Torres v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 838 F.3d 629, 635 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The 
narrow issue in this case is whether the Plaintiffs may prove RICO causation through common 
proof such that individualized issues will not predominate at trial.  The import of this inquiry 
is whether class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).”). 
 66. 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:64. 
 67. Id. § 4:1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); id. r. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). 
 70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); see also infra Part III. 
 71. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 4:2, 4:26; see also infra Part III. 
 72. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 1:7–:10. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. § 1:7. 
 75. See id. 
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Indeed, an attorney faced with such a client would be hesitant to even take 
the case.76  However, the unique procedural mechanics of a class action allow 
small-claim plaintiffs to obtain compensation by allowing a group of people 
with the same claim to consolidate their claims into a single action.77  
Moreover, the aggregation of plaintiffs into one lawsuit actually increases 
compensation by reducing the fees and costs associated with initiating and 
proceeding with a lawsuit individually.78 
In the same vein, class actions also serve a deterrent effect.79  As just 
discussed, when the harm of a defendant’s conduct is dispersed such that 
each harmed individual only has a claim for a small sum of money, no 
individual suit is likely to arise.80  Accordingly, the defendant is free to 
continue engaging in tortious activity since it does not have to pay for it.81  
The defendant is externalizing costs that should be internalized.82  Class 
actions provide for such internalization, as they hold defendants accountable 
for their conduct.83  With the threat of a class action always looming, 
defendants will be more likely to absorb the costs that are associated with 
conforming their conduct to the law.84 
Class actions also provide a deterrent effect by enabling a greater amount 
of nonmonetary litigation.85  An individual plaintiff who seeks injunctive 
relief often sees her case mooted and, therefore, dismissed.86  Consequently, 
the next similarly situated plaintiff is left without a remedy.  Acknowledging 
this problem, the Supreme Court has held that a certified class may possess 
Article III standing whether or not the named plaintiff’s claim has been 
mooted, as long as at least one member of the class still possesses a justiciable 
claim.87  By enabling such suits, private legal enforcement is expanded and 
wrongdoing further deterred.88 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. § 1:8. 
 80. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 81. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:8. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that public agencies cannot 
themselves detect and deter all wrongdoing.  Private suits are an important complement to 
public enforcement.”).  For example, the Court once noted that “[w]hen the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation 
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance 
with the law.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (per curiam). 
 85. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:8. 
 86. This proposition is applicable to mooted class action cases that are not already subject 
to the mootness exception, that is, those cases that are “capable of repetition yet evading 
review.” See id. (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 
498, 514–15 (1911)). 
 87. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) (holding that a named plaintiff’s claim 
may proceed regardless of whether her claim has been mooted, so long as some class 
member’s claim is still justiciable). 
 88. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:8. 
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Class actions also promote efficiency.89  They do so by consolidating 
actions and enabling representative litigation.90  It requires less time and is 
less expensive to proceed through one lawsuit than through several.91  As the 
Supreme Court put it, “[A]n absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do 
anything.  He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content 
in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection.”92  Thus, 
class actions preserve both judicial resources and litigants’ resources.93  
Class actions are especially economical when the class members individually 
have large claims against a defendant, such that each member would pursue 
the action individually, that is, with or without the class action option.94  In 
these situations, courts would be faced with a number of repetitive actions if 
a class action was not permitted.95  Conversely, as just explained, small-claim 
individuals might not litigate at all without the advantages of a class action.96  
Thus, it could be argued that, in these situations, class actions are inefficient, 
as they create the expenditure of time and resources that would otherwise not 
occur.97  However, even in these situations, class actions, as also outlined 
above, provide a deterrent effect that forces would-be defendants to act more 
socially efficient by internalizing costs that should belong to them and not 
imposing them on others.98  This internalization inducement prevents both 
public and private lawsuits from occurring in the first place, thereby not only 
preserving judicial resources, but also preserving resources consumed by 
public enforcement.99 
Finally, class actions enhance the legitimacy of the judiciary by helping 
prevent inconsistent results and thus promoting uniformity in the law.100  
Class actions accomplish this objective by either preventing incompatible 
standards or ensuring that claims predominated by the same issues of law and 
fact are resolved the same way.101  Naturally, when two individual lawsuits 
that share predominantly the same issues of law and fact are resolved 
disparately, the legitimacy of the common law is threatened.102 
 
 89. Id. § 1:9. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 97. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 1:9. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. § 1:10. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
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C.  Distinguishing Mass Actions 
The plaintiffs in the Bristol-Myers litigation proceeded through a mass 
action103 and, more specifically, a mass tort action.104  Mass actions, like 
class actions, present a type of group litigation in which several plaintiffs 
with similar claims consolidate their claims into one action.105  In Bristol-
Myers, for example, a nationwide group of individuals consolidated their 
allegations of injury by Plavix into one action in a California court.106 
Unlike class actions, however, in mass actions every plaintiff is a named 
plaintiff to the lawsuit.  Otherwise stated, a mass action is not a form of 
representative litigation.107  Moreover, as distinguished from class actions, 
mass actions often present situations in which issues of fact or law are more 
particularized among the group of plaintiffs.108  For example, in a mass tort 
action like Bristol-Myers, the individual plaintiffs might have suffered 
varying degrees of harm.  More significantly, a defendant like BMS might 
be able to prove lack of causation for some individuals (say, because of a 
certain individual’s medical history, unhealthy lifestyle, or recent activity) 
but not for others.  Consequently, while the Supreme Court has not 
categorically denied the ability of a group of people who have been injured 
by a defendant’s widespread tortious conduct to form a class, it has indicated 
that such certification will rarely occur.109  In Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor,110 the Court stated: 
[M]ass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending 
upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement.  The 
Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that 
“mass accident” cases are likely to present “significant questions, not only 
of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, . . . affecting the 
individuals in different ways.”  And the Committee advised that such cases 
are “ordinarily not appropriate” for class treatment.  But the text of the Rule 
does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and 
District Courts, since the late 1970’s have been certifying such cases in 
increasing number.  The Committee’s warning, however, continues to call 
for caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among class 
members great.111 
 
 103. The term “mass action” is used in this Note to refer to aggregate litigation that is not 
of the representational variety—or, in other words, aggregate litigation in which every 
claimant is a named plaintiff. 
 104. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777 (2017). 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012). 
 106. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (“[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action 
(except a [class action]) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed 
to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law 
or fact . . . .”). 
 108. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 521 U.S. 591. 
 111. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note to 1966 amendment). 
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Amchem involved a group of plaintiffs attempting to certify a 23(b)(3) 
class on the basis of asbestos-induced injuries.112  The Court denied 
certification on the grounds that, inter alia, the individuals suffered varying 
degrees of harm and “were exposed to different asbestos-containing 
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different 
periods.”113  Two years later, the Court again denied 23(b)(3) certification in 
an asbestos case,114 thereby cementing its reluctant approach to certifying 
money-damage class actions involving personal injury in a mass tort 
context.115  That said, the Amchem Court suggested that “mass accident” 
cases (i.e., cases that have “a single common event at their core”) might 
satisfy the predominance requirement and therefore present situations 
appropriate for 23(b)(3) class certification.116  An example of a “mass 
accident” case is the class action lawsuit that arose after a Hyatt hotel’s 
skywalk collapsed and injured several people.117  In that case, every class 
member was injured by the same, single occurrence.  Therefore, class 
certification was deemed appropriate.118 
In summary, a lawsuit might proceed through a mass action rather than a 
class action because the harmed parties in a mass action are unable to 
demonstrate either the prerequisites of a class action governed by 23(a) (or 
their state equivalent) or, if such prerequisites can be satisfied, the 
requirements demanded by the particular class action category sought by the 
proposed class.  There is no separate rule for mass actions like there is for 
class actions.  Rather, mass actions are governed by the permissive joinder 
rules found in Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.119 
II.  RECENT CASE LAW EXAMINING BRISTOL-MYERS IN THE 
CLASS ACTION CONTEXT 
Despite the fact that Bristol-Myers was decided only in June 2017, several 
courts had already applied it in the class action context within that calendar 
year.  A federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently 
provided defendants with an encouraging answer.  In Plumbers’ Local Union 
No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp.,120 the court declined to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the claims of out-of-state class members.121  The 
court decided this case fewer than five weeks after Bristol-Myers.122  This 
case involved a class action in which the representative plaintiff was a 
 
 112. Id. at 597. 
 113. Id. at 624. 
 114. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 829–30 (1999). 
 115. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 45, § 4:62. 
 116. See id.; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. 
 117. See In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 118. Id. at 1189. 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
 120. No. 16-665, 2017 WL 3129147 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2017). 
 121. See id. at *6. 
 122. Compare id. at *1, with Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1773 (2017). 
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plumbers’ union, headquartered in Pennsylvania, the forum state, which 
provided a health insurance plan to its members, who individually span the 
nation.123  The union alleged that the defendants, all pharmaceutical 
companies, intentionally misrepresented the price of the drugs they sold to 
prescription drug providers.124  The providers, in turn, distributed these drugs 
to the union’s members and allegedly billed the union at an improperly 
inflated price.125  The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the 
defendants as to the non-Pennsylvania claims.126  The court explained:  
“Only Plumbers’ Pennsylvania Claims arise out of or relate to . . . 
Defendants’ sales of generic drugs in Pennsylvania . . . .  Accordingly, the 
Court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over the Non-Pennsylvania 
Claims . . . .”127 
However, while the court cited Bristol-Myers once in the decision to 
support its definition of specific jurisdiction,128 it did not distinguish between 
the mass action brought in Bristol-Myers and the class action before it.  In 
fact, the court seemingly did not rely on Bristol-Myers at all.  Instead, it relied 
on two Northern District of Illinois cases to reach its conclusion regarding 
jurisdiction over the defendants vis-à-vis the non-Pennsylvania plaintiffs.129  
The two Illinois cases did involve class actions and thus presented more 
similar fact patterns.130  Still, it is odd that the court did not rely on Bristol-
Myers at all, especially considering that it cited it earlier in the opinion.131  
The significance here is:  (1) the court did not explicitly extend Bristol-Myers 
to class actions since it did not rely on it, and (2) at least one court, the 
Northern District of Illinois, has been applying Bristol-Myers-like analysis 
to class action lawsuits that predate Bristol-Myers. 
In a case that was decided several weeks later, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of New York more explicitly extended Bristol-Myers 
to the class action context.  In Spratley v. FCA US LLC,132 the court, relying 
on Bristol-Myers, granted the defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion as to the plaintiffs 
whose claims were unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with New York, the 
 
 123. See Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 3129147, at *8. 
 124. See id. at *3. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at *9. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at *6. 
 129. See id. at *9 (citing Demedicis v. CVS Health Corp., No. 16-CV-5973, 2017 WL 
569157 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2017) and Demaria v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15c3321, 2016 WL 
374145 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2016)). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Once Bristol-Myers was issued, the defendants did file a notice of supplemental 
authority to alert the court that the decision supported their 12(b)(2) motion. See Defendants’ 
Notice of Supplemental Authority at 1, Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 3129147, ECF No. 302.  The 
plaintiffs’ only argument in response was that the defendants had consented to jurisdiction by 
registering to do business in Pennsylvania. See Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law 
in Opposition to Certain Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, Apotex Corp., 2017 WL 
3129147, ECF No. 312. 
 132. No. 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). 
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forum state.133  The case involved eight named plaintiffs who alleged that 
Chrysler, the defendant, knowingly concealed a safety defect that was present 
in several of its models.134  All but two of the named plaintiffs, however, had 
no connection to New York.135  They purchased and repaired their defective 
vehicles in other states.136 
The Spratley court did not even address the argument that Bristol-Myers 
is distinguishable in that it involved a mass action as opposed to a class 
action.  Rather, the court analyzed the jurisdictional aspect of the case as 
though it were no different from Bristol-Myers.  The court wrote: 
Plaintiffs argue that the out-of-state Plaintiffs’ claims need not arise from 
Chrysler’s New York activities because the out-of-state Plaintiffs’ claims 
are the same as the New York Plaintiffs’ claims and arise out of Chrysler’s 
nationwide activity.  However, the Supreme Court recently rejected this 
very theory of personal jurisdiction. 
. . . . 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court found specific jurisdiction lacking 
because there was no connection between BMS’s California contacts and 
the nonresidents’ claims.  Similarly, in this case, the out-of-state [named] 
Plaintiffs have shown no connection between their claims and Chrysler’s 
contacts with New York.137 
It is true that the plaintiffs never advanced the argument that Bristol-Myers 
does not extend to class actions because Bristol-Myers involved a mass 
action.138  However, that should not have been significant, as the Spratley 
court was aware of this argument via Justice Sotomayor’s dissent.139  What 
is significant, however, is this court’s treatment of these facts as 
indistinguishable from those of Bristol-Myers.  In this case, the plaintiffs, like 
those in Bristol-Myers, were imperiled by a defective product.140  However, 
in this case, the plaintiffs proceeded procedurally through a class action 
rather than a mass action.141  That said, no plaintiff in this case was physically 
injured.  Still, it is reasonable to think that the court here saw the arbitrariness 
that might result from upholding or denying jurisdiction simply predicated 
on the procedural mechanism the plaintiffs elected to employ.  While this 
case does not directly shed light on the extremely important question of 
whether the reasoning in Bristol-Myers should be extended to unnamed class 
action plaintiffs with no connection to the forum state, it does highlight this 
arbitrariness consideration, which ostensibly weighs in favor of such 
 
 133. See id. at *9. 
 134. See id. at *1. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at *6–7 (citation omitted). 
 138. See Plaintiffs’ Response to FCA US LLC’s Notice of Supplemental Authority in 
Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Spratley, 2017 WL 
4023348, ECF No. 65. 
 139. This is confirmed by the court’s invocation of Bristol-Myers earlier in the opinion. 
See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 140. Spratley, 2017 WL 4023348, at *1. 
 141. See id. 
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extension, at least as to the named plaintiffs in a class action seeking money 
damages.142 
Eight days later, an Eastern District of New York decision suggested that 
Bristol-Myers should extend to class actions, while more directly focusing 
on the distinction between mass actions and class actions.143  The court 
stated: 
Plaintiffs attempt to side-step the due process holdings in Bristol-Myers by 
arguing that the case has no effect on the law in class actions because the 
case before the Supreme Court was not a class action.  This argument is 
flawed.  The constitutional requirements of due process does [sic] not wax 
and wane when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class.  Personal 
jurisdiction in class actions must comport with due process just the same as 
any other case.144 
This case involved a group of dentists alleging that a group of distributors 
acted in violation of antitrust laws and artificially raised the price of dental 
supplies.  The court dismissed one of the defendants from the lawsuit on the 
grounds that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over that defendant, 
who had practically no contacts with New York, the forum state.  However, 
because all the plaintiffs involved in the case resided in New York, the 
lawsuit proceeded against the other defendants.  Accordingly, the exact issue 
in Bristol-Myers was not implicated.  Still, the court’s strong language here 
suggests that it would extend the Bristol-Myers holding to the class action 
context. 
Two days later, a district court in the Northern District of California 
refused to extend Bristol-Myers.  In Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple 
Group,145 two named plaintiffs, both California residents, sued Dr. Pepper 
on behalf of a nationwide class, alleging that Dr. Pepper intentionally 
employed deceptive advertising practices by inducing people to believe its 
ginger ale contained real ginger.146  Dr. Pepper, relying on Bristol-Myers, 
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the non-California 
class members, who independently had no connection to California as it 
related to Dr. Pepper’s contacts with the state.147  The plaintiffs argued that 
Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions, but only to mass actions.148 
 
 142. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that issues of law and fact predominate over the class 
members’ claims, which indicates that the class here attempted to obtain 23(b)(3) certification. 
 143. See In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., No. 16 C.V. 696, 2017 WL 4217115, at *1, 
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017). 
 144. Id. at *9. 
 145. No. 17-CV-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017). 
 146. See id. at *1. 
 147. See id. at *3. 
 148. See id. at *5.  The plaintiffs also argued that Bristol-Myers did not apply because they 
were in federal court and Bristol-Myers involved a state court action, a scenario the majority 
in Bristol-Myers explicitly chose not to rule on. See id. at *4.  The Supreme Court in Bristol-
Myers stated that “since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the 
same restriction on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.” Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017).  However, the Dr. Pepper 
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The court agreed with the plaintiffs and denied Dr. Pepper’s 12(b)(2) 
motion on the grounds that 
[i]n a mass tort action . . . each plaintiff [is] a real party in interest to the 
complaints, meaning that they [are] named as plaintiffs in the complaint.  
In a putative class action, like the one before the Court, one or more 
plaintiffs seek to represent the rest of the similarly situated plaintiffs, and 
the “named plaintiffs” are the only plaintiffs actually named in the 
complaint.149 
All the named plaintiffs in this action, the court noted, were California 
residents.150  As such, the court, despite recognizing that the named plaintiffs 
were chosen precisely to circumvent Bristol-Myers,151 concluded that 
Bristol-Myers did not extend so far.152 
In so holding, the court relied in part on a separate Supreme Court case, 
Devlin v. Scardelletti,153 in which the Court stated that “[n]onnamed class 
members . . . may be parties for some purposes and not for others.  The label 
“party” does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion 
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on 
context.”154  The court continued:  “The Supreme Court in Devlin specified 
some of these procedural rules, and all dealt with promoting expediency in 
class action litigation.”155  The court ultimately decided that unnamed class 
members are not parties when such status relates to personal jurisdiction. 
However, the court proceeded further by noting that “[p]erhaps this may 
be one of those contexts in which an unnamed class member should be 
considered as [a] part[y]” because of the language the Supreme Court elected 
to use in Bristol-Myers.156  Nonetheless, the court concluded that the facts in 
front of it were “meaningfully distinguishable” from those in Bristol-Myers, 
as each plaintiff in Bristol-Myers was a named party to the lawsuit.157 
Two features of Dr. Pepper stand out:  (1) the court’s recognition that 
Bristol-Myers pushed substantially in the direction of granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss; and (2) its literal approach to distinguishing 
between class and mass actions.  The latter establishes that, had any of the 
named plaintiffs been one of the non-California class members, the court 
would have granted Dr. Pepper’s 12(b)(2) motion as to those plaintiffs.  Thus, 
this case seems consistent with Spratley, in which the court granted the 
defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion on the grounds that several of the named 
 
court rejected that argument and held that Bristol-Myers is equally applicable to federal 
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 153. 536 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 154. See Dr. Pepper, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting Devlin, 536 
U.S. at 9–10). 
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plaintiffs failed to satisfy the standard articulated in Bristol-Myers.  Such an 
implication, of course, serves as merely a hiccup for plaintiffs’ lawyers, as 
they could simply select their class representatives carefully, a technique 
employed by the plaintiffs’ counsel in Dr. Pepper.158  Still, such a limitation 
certainly would make the class certification process at least a little more 
difficult. 
The implications illustrated by the former point—that is, that the court paid 
homage to the Supreme Court’s diction—are potentially much larger.  The 
language to which the court refers, although not specified, is likely the 
federalism language excerpted in Part I.A.159  The Bristol-Myers Court made 
sure to emphasize the federalism concerns that would arise from enabling a 
California court to exercise jurisdiction over the non-California plaintiffs.160  
While it premised its decision on a “straightforward application” of specific 
jurisdiction jurisprudence,161 the Court drove its constitutional due process 
point home by warning that enabling jurisdiction would infringe upon the 
sovereignty of other states.162  Perhaps the court in Dr. Pepper was 
acknowledging that mass actions and class actions are indistinguishable in 
this federalism context, while choosing nonetheless to cling to the literal 
differences between the two.  Or, maybe the court did perceive a palpable 
distinction stemming from the fact that class actions involve unnamed 
plaintiffs and mass actions do not.  Whatever its motivation, the court here 
did provide an extremely useful question:  In light of the language used by 
the Bristol-Myers Court, are class actions distinguishable from mass actions?  
In other words, do the differences between class actions and mass actions 
provide a basis on which to argue that exercising jurisdiction over unnamed 
class members with no connection to the forum state does not infringe on the 
sovereignty of other states? 
The court in Dr. Pepper also cited the Supreme Court’s Devlin decision as 
support for its holding.  That case articulated that unnamed class members 
may be considered parties to the litigation “for some purposes and not for 
others.”163  The Devlin Court indicated that the main criterion when deciding 
between inclusion and exclusion should be efficiency.164  Accordingly, 
Devlin highlighted the efficiency objective realized by proceeding through a 
class action.  Devlin, then, may not be an obstacle to extending Bristol-Myers 
to unnamed class members, as the Bristol-Myers Court emphatically 
dismissed California’s efficiency argument and pointed instead to the 
sovereignty issues that would result from allowing such an exercise of 
jurisdiction.165  However, the Devlin Court was not driven by the same 
federalism concern that drove the Bristol-Myers Court, since the Devlin 
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decision had nothing to do with personal jurisdiction, but rather with the 
proper status of unnamed class members.  As such, it is hard to rely too 
heavily on Devlin for answers. 
Dr. Pepper’s analysis was recently followed by the Eastern District of 
Kentucky in Day v. Air Methods Corp.166  Day involved a class of plaintiffs 
who alleged that their employer failed to adequately compensate them for the 
overtime hours they worked.167  The district court judge in Day held that, at 
least as to unnamed class members, extension of Bristol-Myers is not 
justified.168  The court invoked both Dr. Pepper and Devlin to support its 
conclusion.169 
A more recent case that has examined the issue, however, seems 
indistinguishable from Dr. Pepper, yet comes to a different conclusion.  In 
McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC,170 the Northern District of 
Illinois held that the jurisdictional analysis in Bristol-Myers does extend to 
unnamed class members who have no independent connection to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.171  In so holding, the court 
explicitly relied on Bristol-Myers,172 while also acknowledging that the Dr. 
Pepper court came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts.173  McDonnell 
involved a class of individuals alleging a pecuniary injury inflicted by the 
defendant’s deceptive advertising of its product.174  In declining to exercise 
personal jurisdiction, the court explained that “[p]urchasers of [the 
defendant’s] products . . . who live in Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, or Washington have no injury arising from 
[the defendant’s] forum-related activities in Illinois.”175  The court’s 
conclusion here is unsurprising though, as Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 
Health Plan evidenced that the Northern District of Illinois had already been 
applying Bristol-Myers-like analysis to the class action context.176 
Yet, an even more recent decision also confronted the issue directly and 
held, in line with Dr. Pepper, that Bristol-Myers should not extend to class 
actions.  In In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liability 
Litigation,177 homeowners spanning several states brought individual actions 
alleging that their Chinese-manufactured drywall emitted gasses that caused 
injury.178  All of the federal actions were consolidated for pretrial 
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proceedings in a multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 
2009.179  In 2014, the court certified a 23(b)(3) class.180  Following the 
issuance of Bristol-Myers, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction181 as to the nonresident class members involved in 
each forum’s class action proceeding.182  In denying the motion, the court 
cited Dr. Pepper for the proposition that class actions are meaningfully 
distinguishable from mass tort actions and thus escape the grasp of Bristol-
Myers.183  The court proceeded to distinguish the two types of actions by 
noting the “different due process safeguards” that apply only to class 
actions.184  The court further distinguished the two procedural devices by 
emphasizing the stringent requirements that need to be satisfied in order to 
obtain class certification, including the predominance and superiority 
requirements that apply only to 23(b)(3) actions.185  The court used these 
requirements to illustrate that there are bona fide differences between a 
certified class and an aggregation of individuals proceeding through joinder 
rules.186  Interestingly, this court implicitly went even further than the Dr. 
Pepper court because all the plaintiffs involved in this case were named 
parties to the lawsuit.187 
The foregoing decisions illustrate that, at least shortly after Bristol-Myers, 
courts are wildly divided on this issue.  They also shed light on the 
fundamental question at hand.  If the Dr. Pepper and Chinese-Manufactured 
Drywall courts’ position that there are meaningful distinctions between a 
mass action group and a class action group is to be credited, Bristol-Myers 
ought to be deemed inapplicable to the class action context.  However, if 
mass action groups are more properly perceived as indistinguishable from 
class action groups with regard to personal jurisdiction and state sovereignty 
concerns, as other courts have indicated, then extension of Bristol-Myers is 
unavoidable. 
III.  ANSWERING WHETHER (AND WHERE) EXTENSION 
OF BRISTOL-MYERS IS WARRANTED 
Whether class actions are meaningfully distinguishable from mass actions 
with respect to personal jurisdiction depends on the features of the class 
action in question.  Each class action type is defined by characteristics that 
differentiate them.  These distinctions, in turn, are important for determining 
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which class action types, if any, should be limited by Bristol-Myers.  At its 
core, the issue of extending Bristol-Myers centers on whether the classes 
involved in each class action type are more properly perceived as individual 
entities or, instead, as aggregations of individuals. 
If a class of plaintiffs is properly viewed as an individual entity, like a 
public corporation, then Bristol-Myers should not be deemed applicable.  
When one corporation sues another corporation for the latter’s nationwide 
tortious conduct, the former is able to sue in any jurisdiction in which that 
conduct occurred.  This is true even if some of the plaintiff-corporation’s 
shareholders were injured by the defendant-corporation’s conduct in a state 
other than the forum state.  This result is driven by the perception of a 
corporation as an individual unit.  Accordingly, if a class of plaintiffs is 
similarly (and properly) regarded as an individual entity, extension does not 
seem warranted.  
This view is arguably consistent with the Supreme Court’s Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc.188 opinion, in which the Court granted jurisdiction 
over the defendant, Hustler Magazine, despite the fact that only part of the 
plaintiff’s claim arose in New Hampshire, the forum state.189  In that case, 
the plaintiff, a New York resident, sued Hustler for libel that arose from its 
publication of stories involving the plaintiff.190  Hustler is neither 
incorporated nor headquartered in New Hampshire.191  The plaintiff sued in 
New Hampshire because that was the only forum in which her claim was not 
time-barred,192 and the publication at issue was distributed nationally.193  
Consequently, the Court stated that the “cause of action arises out of the very 
activity being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.”194  Similarly, if a class 
is seen as an individual entity, the cause of action will arise, in part, in the 
forum state, presuming that at least one member’s injury is connected to that 
state.  That said, Keeton is distinguishable in that the plaintiff was, arguably, 
injured in New Hampshire, since she was, arguably, injured in every state in 
which the alleged lies were spread.  Further, the federalism limitation 
presented by Bristol-Myers is not as implicated in Keeton since New 
Hampshire has an interest in preventing the dissemination of lies about 
within its borders.  Again, however, the same is true of a class of plaintiffs 
when the class is viewed as an individual entity, since at least a part of that 
entity is harmed wherever the defendant’s injurious conduct occurs.  Still, 
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Keeton provides the most liberal limits of the Court’s approach to personal 
jurisdiction.195 
Alternately, a class of plaintiffs can be viewed as an aggregation of 
individuals, each of whom possess individual, substantive rights.  Seen in 
this light, Rule 23 and state equivalents merely exist as useful procedural 
devices that can help individuals vindicate their rights efficiently.  Class 
actions allow representative litigation, but preserve the individuality of each 
member’s substantive claims.  Thus, if a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction was granted as to the unconnected plaintiffs in a mass 
action, that same group should not be able to proceed through a class action. 
Judge (then Professor) Diane Wood commented on the issue of personal 
jurisdiction in class actions twenty years ago.196  In doing so, she recognized 
the importance of determining whether a class is perceived as an individual 
unit or instead as an aggregation of individuals.197  She also understood 
(perhaps prophetically) that this distinction is crucial in light of state 
sovereignty concerns.198  She asserted that “a court’s adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over the different kinds of parties in class actions—named 
representatives, in-state absentees, and absentees with no links to the 
adjudicating forum—is a function of the cohesiveness of the class before the 
court and of the representational nature of the particular class action.”199  She 
believes that the more cohesive the class the more “assured we are that any 
particular member who comes before the court seeking to be a class 
representative will in fact be capable of satisfactorily standing in for the 
absentees.”200  If a class is sufficiently cohesive, “[t]he adjudicatory 
jurisdiction of the forum court to affect the right of absentees is a function of 
the court’s power to affect the representative before it.”201  Conversely, 
Wood believes that if a class contains important differences among the 
represented individuals, the class is more properly regarded as an aggregation 
of individuals and therefore personal jurisdiction must be evaluated as to each 
class member.202  Thus, Wood would reject a one-size-fits-all approach and 
instead take a nuanced approach to the question of whether Bristol-Myers 
should extend to the class action context.  Indeed, such an approach seems 
appropriate in light of the significant distinctions among the different class 
types. 
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A.  Bristol-Myers’s Applicability to 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) Actions 
Rule 23(b)(1) governs “incompatible-standards” and “limited-fund” class 
actions, which involve individual claims that “are so intertwined that class 
adjudication is essential.”203  For example, using the “incompatible 
standards” bond example, imagine if one court declared a municipal bond 
void in one individual action and another court declared the same bond valid 
in a separate individual action.204  The municipality is left having no clue 
how to act.205  These incompatible judgments make the class action device 
not only seem preferable but necessary for effective resolution.206  In effect, 
then, a 23(b)(1)(A) class cannot be disaggregated.  Accordingly, it is no 
surprise that in 23(b)(1)(A) class actions there is generally neither a notice 
requirement nor an opportunity for an unnamed class member to opt out.207 
The same is true of 23(b)(1)(B) class actions.  In a limited-fund case, 
proceeding individually will create a “race to the courthouse,” as the 
defendant would only have the ability to compensate a limited number of 
individuals.208  However, under 23(b)(1)(B), every harmed individual in the 
class can be compensated according to her pro rata share.  As such, allowing 
class members to opt out of such an action would undermine the purpose of 
having this category in the first place, namely, to ensure that claimants get 
their fair share.209  The formation of a class in limited-fund situations, then, 
also provides the only means by which a group of individuals is able to 
vindicate its substantive rights.210 
After considering the characteristics of 23(b)(1) class actions, it seems 
necessary to conclude that a class certified under this category is more 
properly perceived as an individual entity.  In fact, it makes little sense to 
view these class actions differently.  The precise reason these types of class 
actions exist is to avoid individuals contradicting (in incompatible-standards 
actions) or usurping (in limited-fund actions) other individuals’ rights.  In 
these class actions, the members’ claims are “so intertwined” that it is 
essential for their claims to become one.  To use Judge Wood’s words, these 
classes are sufficiently cohesive to assure “that any particular member who 
comes before the court seeking to be a class representative will in fact be 
capable of satisfactorily standing in for the absentees.”211 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated its agreement with this perception 
through its decision to make notice and opt-out rights discretionary and, as 
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to opt-out rights, often forbidden in 23(b)(1) proceedings.212  While 23(b)(3) 
money-damage class actions mandate provision of such rights to comport 
with due process, the same due process concern does not manifest itself in 
23(b)(1) class actions.213  The reason for this is clear:  individuals’ due 
process rights are not threatened by 23(b)(1) proceedings because 23(b)(1) 
proceedings involve situations in which the class mechanism is the only way 
to reasonably take action.  The only way to achieve satisfactory resolution of 
a 23(b)(1) issue is for a class to form and proceed together as one.  The class 
members’ claims are inextricably linked.  No class member is foregoing an 
alternative to proceed individually because the claims can only successfully 
exist together.  Thus, this constitutional due process concern is not 
implicated.  Nor is the Bristol-Myers Court’s federalism concern because, 
under the “entity” characterization, the class is injured in any state in which 
one of its members is injured.  In other words, the class’s claim arises in any 
state in which the defendant’s contacts injured any portion of the class. 
However, 23(b)(1) class actions are the least utilized type.214  One 
explanation for this grounds itself in the Rule’s due process approach.215  As 
mentioned, the Supreme Court has held that class actions involving money 
damages require notice and opt-out rights for unnamed class members.216  
Consequently, 23(b)(1) class actions that are not of the limited-fund variety 
are generally limited to actions seeking injunctive relief, since notice and opt-
out rights are inconsistent with the nature of 23(b)(1) classes.217  Injunctive 
relief class actions, however, typically take the form of 23(b)(2) class 
actions.218 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, or “injunctive” class actions, however, are 
defined by similarly unitary characteristics.  As the Supreme Court itself 
noted, 23(b)(2) classes are defined by their “indivisible nature” and 
“the notion that the [defendant’s] conduct is such that it can be enjoined or 
declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”  
In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or 
declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It 
does not authorize class certification when each individual class member 
would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against 
the defendant.  Similarly, it does not authorize class certification when each 
member would be entitled to an individualized award of money 
damages.219 
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Class certification is only appropriate in 23(b)(2) actions when a decision to 
enjoin or permit the defendant’s allegedly harmful conduct as to an individual 
would necessarily affect the class as a whole.220  Accordingly, here, as in 
23(b)(1) class actions, “unitary adjudication is not only preferable, but it is 
also essential.”221  Unsurprisingly, in 23(b)(2) class actions, as in 23(b)(1) 
class actions, notice need not be provided, and the opportunity to opt out is 
generally not afforded.222  Again, the law acknowledges the entity-like feel 
of 23(b)(2) classes and, accordingly, understands that the due process 
concerns implicated by the class action device are not as present in these 
“injunctive” classes. 
As indicated earlier, this type of class action is commonly employed in 
civil and constitutional rights cases.223  However, since only injunctive relief 
is sought in these actions, the following question might sometimes arise:  
Why would a plaintiff bother going through the class certification process if 
she is just seeking to enjoin a certain defendant’s conduct?224  If she wins an 
individual suit, while the outcome would certainly affect individuals not 
involved in the action (making certification appropriate), the court 
nonetheless would enjoin the defendant’s wrongful conduct, so why endure 
the extra hurdles presented by the class certification process?225 
The answer to these questions manifests itself in the mootness point made 
earlier when class action objectives were discussed.226  Take the famous civil 
rights class action case, Brown v. Board of Education.227  In that case, if the 
named plaintiff, Linda Brown, proceeded individually, she would likely have 
graduated school well before resolution of her case, thereby causing her 
claim to be moot.228  However, because the mootness doctrine does not apply 
to class action lawsuits as long as someone in the class has a justiciable 
claim,229 an injunctive class action allowed Linda Brown to vindicate her 
rights.230  This mootness rule magnifies the 23(b)(2) class’s “entity” status.  
On one hand, this mootness rule can be viewed as yet another constitutional 
exception applicable to class action lawsuits.231  This exception would read 
something like:  class actions are an exception to Article III’s “case-or-
controversy” requirement.  Or, this mootness rule can be viewed not as a 
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constitutional exception but as consistent both with the Constitution and with 
the view that 23(b)(2) classes are individual units, comprised of many 
individual parts, but capable of legal action only as a whole.  In this light, the 
class’s claim is justiciable, as the class still has many controversies in need 
of a remedy.  Thus, the mootness “exception” is not exceptional at all. 
Additionally, a plaintiff like Linda Brown might seek class certification 
because the scope of relief expands as more people join a 23(b)(2) action.232  
If Linda Brown had won an individual action, it is possible that only her 
school would have been desegregated.233  However, by representing all of 
the black students in her community, Linda Brown desegregated an entire 
school district.234  This relationship between class size and remedy size again 
elucidates the unified persona that defines 23(b)(2) actions.  The larger a 
23(b)(2) class grows, the greater the remedial impact an injunction will have.  
This effect is a product of the inseparability of each member’s claim.  As the 
unified claim grows in magnitude, so, too, does the impact of the court’s 
resolution. 
Moreover, 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes fully embody the representative 
litigation that Rule 23 was created to establish.  Using Judge Wood’s 
approach, these class action types are both sufficiently cohesive and truly 
representational.235  The necessity of employing these class types in certain 
situations ensures that the named plaintiff or plaintiffs in these actions 
genuinely are standing in for the absentees.  Any class member could serve 
as the named plaintiff without altering the substance or structure of the 
lawsuit.  Referring back to the corporation analogy, shareholders may sell 
their shares to new owners, but the company’s operations remain the same. 
The foregoing reasons illustrate why Bristol-Myers should not extend to 
23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class actions (or to analogous state class actions) that 
seek to avoid incompatible results, involve limited-fund defendants, or seek 
injunctive relief.  These classes are more properly regarded as individual 
entities.  Accordingly, when any part of that unit is harmed by the defendant’s 
contacts with a particular state, that state presents a constitutionally sound 
forum. 
B.  Bristol-Myers’s Applicability to 23(b)(3) Actions 
Finally, there is the 23(b)(3), or “money-damage” class action.  While the 
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions present situations in which the individual 
class members are inextricably linked, the members in a money-damage class 
“typically are not so intertwined.”236  Rather, money-damage class actions 
serve to promote efficiency by consolidating the claims of several similarly 
situated individuals.237  Unlike the other types of class actions, then, the 
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formation of a 23(b)(3) class is not essential for effective resolution.  In 
money-damage class actions, each individual could initiate her own claim 
individually and be entitled to the same remedy as that which she could 
obtain through a class action.238  Furthermore, the individual class members 
in money-damage class actions are often entitled to varying amounts of 
compensation upon a favorable resolution.239  There is, accordingly, not as 
strong a feeling of interconnectedness among the members in 23(b)(3) 
proceedings.  Indeed, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure acknowledged as much when it wrote that “class-action treatment 
is not as clearly called for” in 23(b)(3) class actions.240  As such, it is harder 
to argue for the “entity” perception when evaluating 23(b)(3) class actions. 
However, as earlier explained, one of the central objectives of class actions 
is to enable people to obtain compensation for small claims that would be 
inefficient to pursue as individual actions.241  This objective is attained 
through the use of 23(b)(3) money-damage classes.242  Not only does 
proceeding through a 23(b)(3) class action ensure compensation for a group 
of individuals who would not otherwise be made whole, but, as also noted 
earlier, it has the effect of deterring the wrongdoer’s harmful conduct.243  
Thus, in these small-claim 23(b)(3) class actions, as in 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) 
actions, the class mechanism can be seen as essential for the attainment of a 
remedy.  The same cannot be said of mass tort actions, like the one in Bristol-
Myers, in which many of the claimants sought damages that would also be 
worth seeking in an individual action.244 
Still, the reality is that small-claim money-damage class actions feasibly 
could be brought as several individual claims; it would just be incredibly 
inefficient for any individual plaintiff to do so.  Consequently, even these 
23(b)(3) class actions are grounded in efficiency concerns.  Thus, the 
question of Bristol-Myers’s extension to 23(b)(3) class actions does not 
warrant as clear of an answer.  And while it is true that small-claim 23(b)(3) 
cases accomplish beneficial deterrent and compensatory objectives, such 
benefits would not be eliminated by the extension of Bristol-Myers.  Rather, 
these benefits would simply be limited to realization in either the defendant’s 
home state, or in a forum in which the defendant’s contacts with the state 
give rise to each member’s claim. 
There is, however, something to be said about undermining 23(b)(3)’s 
efficiency objective.  Extending Bristol-Myers to 23(b)(3) actions would 
make it hard for plaintiffs to form voluminous classes.  In situations where a 
defendant’s wrongdoing injures a class of people nationwide, the only forum 
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in which a nationwide class action could likely proceed is a state in which 
the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.  Such a severe obstacle will 
make it difficult for these classes to form and will increase the likelihood of 
creating a series of lawsuits as opposed to a single class action.  
Consequently, the objective of achieving “economies of time, effort, and 
expense”245 (i.e., the efficiency objective) would be greatly mitigated.  One 
could argue that mass actions are similarly available to promote efficiency.246  
This argument, as it relates to the Bristol-Myers holding, would proceed by 
noting that the efficiency benefits of mass actions were explicitly subjugated 
by the Court in favor of federalism concerns.  As such, the argument would 
conclude, the same reasoning should apply to money-damage class actions. 
Yet, the efficiency accomplishments of mass actions are not as substantial 
as those of class actions.247  The extent to which efficiency is more 
substantially achieved in 23(b)(3) class actions than mass actions is 
highlighted by the predominance requirement.  Because “questions of law or 
fact . . . [must] predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members,”248 the 23(b)(3) class action guarantees an efficient result.  Mass 
actions, on the other hand, while always involving some common issues of 
law and fact, often involve plaintiffs whose individual cases differ 
significantly from one another.249  These differences, in turn, require 
additional and particularized litigation, thereby mitigating the mass action’s 
economical objective.250 
Still, it is hard to avoid that Bristol-Myers explicitly dismissed efficiency 
concerns by highlighting federalism concerns.  After all, extension of Bristol-
Myers still permits class actions in defendants’ home states.  Moreover, since 
only the named plaintiffs are required to litigate in class actions, the burden 
of litigating in the defendant’s home state is much lighter than would be in a 
mass action, in which all the plaintiffs are named.  Thus, the argument for 
not extending Bristol-Myers can only be won by illustrating that 23(b)(3) 
class actions do not encounter the same federalism obstacle as mass tort 
actions.  Arguing that class actions achieve greater efficiency than mass 
actions and, therefore, that Bristol-Myers should be stopped in its tracks, does 
just the opposite. 
Furthermore, 23(b)(3) class actions do not always involve an aggregation 
of individuals with de minimis claims.  Sometimes they involve an 
aggregation of claimants who each individually are seeking a substantial 
monetary award from a defendant.251  In these cases, procedural efficiency 
does seem to be the driving rationale behind proceeding through a class 
action.252  Accordingly, it is harder to distinguish these class action types 
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from the Bristol-Myers-like mass actions, which also ground themselves in 
an efficiency rationale. 
However, the 23(b)(3) predominance requirement does not only further 
efficiency aims, it also promotes uniformity in the law, the other central 
purpose of a 23(b)(3) action.253  The predominance requirement presents a 
high threshold that needs to be met in order to get a money-damage class 
action certified.  Requiring “questions of law or fact common to class 
members [to] predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members”254 ensures that members of a 23(b)(3) class are similarly situated 
to a high degree, which, in turn, promotes consistency in the law by resolving 
the similarly situated claims the same way.  If each member of a 23(b)(3) 
class were to proceed individually, there is a significant chance that the 
similarly situated cases would be resolved by contradictory judgments.  One 
court might set precedent X while another court sets precedent Y on 
substantially identical claims.  Indeed, the predominance requirement is 
“meant to assess whether the class’s interests are sufficiently cohesive to 
warrant adjudication by representation.”255  The same sense of cohesion is 
not as sought-after in mass actions.  The risk of having inconsistency in the 
law by disassembling a mass action is not nearly as great, as different 
outcomes are often justifiable because claimants often present key factual 
differences among their respective cases.256  On the other hand, forcing a 
23(b)(3) class to disassemble and litigate separately does risk inconsistency 
in the law, as the initial formation of the class required each individual’s 
claim to be governed by predominantly the same legal and factual disputes.  
Whether the Bristol-Myers Court’s federalism concern trumps this legal 
inconsistency problem is a closer question. 
Naturally, the contention arises that, in Bristol-Myers, California premised 
its specific jurisdiction argument on the fact that the claims of the nonresident 
plaintiffs were identical to those of the California plaintiffs:  the nonresident 
plaintiffs, like the California plaintiffs, ingested and were subsequently 
injured by Plavix.257  The Court, of course, rejected this argument.258  
Therefore, it can be argued that extension to 23(b)(3) class actions is 
warranted even in the face of 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. 
Yet, California could not argue that inconsistency in the law might flow 
from the Court’s decision to deny personal jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs’ 
cases likely involved significant distinctions, including different Plavix-
inflicted injuries and varying levels of causation evidence.259  This makes 
sense in light of the fact that a key distinguishing factor between mass actions 
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and 23(b)(3) class actions is the latter’s predominance requirement, which, 
again, serves to promote uniformity in the law. 
However, the Spratley court seemingly was not affected by the 
distinguishing effect of the predominance requirement. Although that court 
did not explicitly address Bristol-Myers’s extension to class actions, it did 
invoke Bristol-Myers to grant the defendant’s 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.260  
Above, it was conjectured that such dismissal might have been predicated on 
an arbitrariness concern—namely, that upholding jurisdiction would allow 
plaintiffs like these to proceed through a class action when a mass action 
would be barred by Bristol-Myers.  Accordingly, proceeding through a class 
action would have the effect of providing these plaintiffs with a procedural 
loophole. 
Yet, the fact that plaintiffs may sometimes choose between proceeding 
through a mass action or class action does not provide a procedural loophole 
as much as it speaks to the selectiveness of a 23(b)(3) class action.  The 
predominance requirement decides which groups of people can proceed 
through a class action.  Often, the members of a 23(b)(3) class could have 
proceeded through a mass action, but not vice versa.  It is more appropriate 
to form a 23(b)(3) class when the same issues of law and fact predominate 
over each individual claim.  The reverse is not true—most mass actions do 
not meet the requirements needed to proceed through a class action.  Thus, 
there is no arbitrariness in not extending Bristol-Myers to money-damage 
class actions because the predominance requirement serves to meaningfully 
distinguish a class-action-qualified group from a mass-action-qualified one.  
The ability to qualify for class certification speaks to the nature of a particular 
group of individuals—one that is inherently more cohesive than a group 
unable to obtain such certification.  Conversely, a group that is too dominated 
by particularized facts cannot be properly regarded as a class. 
Another telling distinction is that class actions are rarely appropriate in the 
personal injury context.261  The only instance in which class certification is 
sometimes warranted is when the injuries arise from a single occurrence, 
such as the collapse of the Hyatt skywalk.262  Again, this illustrates the 
natural distinction between class action and mass action groups.  When 
several injuries occur as the result of an isolated occurrence, the issues of law 
and fact will generally predominate over each individual’s claim, as there are 
no major discrepancies as to the manner in which the individuals were 
harmed.  Using the skywalk example, each individual was injured at the exact 
same time, in the exact same place, by the exact same accident.  That can 
easily be contrasted with the injuries associated with Bristol-Myers.  There, 
important differences like dosage and medical and personal history served to 
individualize each person’s claim.  This distinction between these two types 
of personal injury cases exemplifies the predominance requirement as an 
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effective mechanism used to only qualify groups that are sufficiently 
cohesive. 
Still, as the Dr. Pepper and Day courts explicitly addressed, and as the 
Spratley court implicitly acknowledged, there seems to be a difference 
between extending the Bristol-Myers holding to class actions in which 
unnamed class members cannot establish specific (or general) jurisdiction 
and extending Bristol-Myers in class actions in which some of the named 
plaintiffs cannot establish personal jurisdiction.  In the former situation, Dr. 
Pepper and Day do not view extension as warranted or proper.263  In the latter 
situation, all three courts seem to think extension is appropriate.264  After all, 
every plaintiff in a mass action is named and the Bristol-Myers Court clearly 
denied jurisdiction to the plaintiffs with claims unrelated to the forum state.  
However, to distinguish on these grounds is to diminish the more meaningful 
distinction between money-damage class actions and mass actions—namely, 
the greater cohesion among those involved in the former as well as the 
former’s more substantial promotion of legal consistency.  Distinguishing 
between named and unnamed class members undermines the essence of the 
23(b)(3) class because it suggests that the primary way to distinguish class 
actions from mass actions is by acknowledging that the former involves 
representatives, while the latter does not.  While this is still a meaningful 
distinction, it does not as sensibly warrant paralyzing Bristol-Myers in light 
of the Court’s federalism language.  However, the named-unnamed 
distinction is the more palpable one, as it allows courts to grab onto a concrete 
difference between the two forms of litigation. 
However, relying on the differences between what lies at the core of mass 
actions and class actions might be viewed as an exercise in abstraction.  
Judges are asked to make law according to established legal principles; the 
more concrete distinction allows them to do so here.  However, to really 
illustrate how 23(b)(3) class actions do not implicate the federalism concern 
focused on by the Bristol-Myers Court, the named-unnamed distinction 
might be better seen as a product of the differences in nature between mass 
and class actions.  In other words, the greater sense of cohesion in the former 
enables a unique type of litigation—representative litigation—that 
concretely projects the differences between the two types of lawsuits through 
the unnamed-named distinction.  Still, as Judge Wood noted, a forum state’s 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over the unnamed members of a sufficiently 
cohesive class “is a function of the court’s power to affect the representative 
before it.”265  Thus, as indicated by the judges in Spratley and Dr. Pepper, 
class representatives—that is, named parties in a class action—must satisfy 
the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Bristol-Myers. 
Still, the due process constraints that limit only 23(b)(3) actions seemingly 
weigh in favor of extension of Bristol-Myers to both named and unnamed 
class members.  To remain consistent with the Due Process Clause, provision 
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of notice and opt-out rights to all class members in a money-damage class 
action is mandatory.266  This requirement serves to highlight the 
constitutional due process concerns that arise in 23(b)(3) actions as compared 
to the other class action types, which do not mandate provision of notice or 
opt-out rights.267  As the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes268 
stated: 
[Rule 23(b)(2)] does not require that class members be given notice and 
opt-out rights, presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that 
notice has no purpose when the class is mandatory, and that depriving 
people of their right to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process 
Clause.  In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages 
we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process.269 
Due to the fact that 23(b)(3) classes, unlike the other class types, are not 
essential to afford claimants proper relief, “an individual litigant can pursue 
her own money damage action without affecting other similarly situated 
parties.”270  As such, the members of 23(b)(3) classes need to be given 
minimal due process rights, namely, notice of the lawsuit and an opportunity 
to opt out.271  In 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, conversely, these 
requirements are absent because of the classes’ individualized nature.272  
Since the only way to obtain an effective remedy in these class action types 
is through the formation of a class, notice and opt-out rights are not seen as 
necessary.273  Thus, the Due Process Clause here serves to distinguish 
23(b)(3) class actions with more of an aggregate feel than an “entity” class 
action. 
Furthermore, as Professor Carol Rice Andrews noted years before Bristol-
Myers tightened the specific jurisdiction doctrine, the Constitution (and the 
Court’s interpretation of it) conceivably does limit jurisdiction in nationwide 
class actions in which certain class members have no connection to the forum 
state—or, what Andrews terms the “problem class action.”274  In illustrating 
her point, Andrews relies on Shutts.275  Specifically, she highlights the 
Court’s choice-of-law analysis, an area that is also governed by the Due 
Process Clause but is less constitutionally stringent because it does not 
require the defendant to have purposely availed itself of the forum state.276  
Instead, for a state’s choice-of-law rules to be applied, “that State must have 
a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state 
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally 
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unfair.”277  In Shutts, the Court held that Kansas, the forum state, could not 
apply its choice-of-law rules to the claims of the class members whose cases 
did not arise out of the defendant’s contacts with Kansas.278  Here, then, the 
formation of a class did not except the members with claims unrelated to the 
forum state from the constitutional limitations of the Due Process Clause.  
Andrews argued: 
The same conclusion can apply to personal jurisdiction.  If the relationship 
between the claims of the unnamed class members and the forum were 
insufficient to meet the test for choice of law, then it seemingly would be 
insufficient to meet the more demanding due process test for personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.279 
However, the choice-of-law inquiry is often explored after personal 
jurisdiction has been established.280  Indeed, the choice-of-law limitation 
serves as a constitutional safeguard for situations in which personal 
jurisdiction has been established in the forum state, but the forum state does 
not serve as the optimal state for choice of law, as was the case in Shutts 
itself.281  Accordingly, choice-of-law due process concerns actually help to 
mitigate the federalism concern of failing to extend Bristol-Myers to class 
actions. 
Yet, Judge Wood indicated that specific jurisdiction ought to only be 
asserted over a defendant opposing a class if:  (1) specific jurisdiction can 
properly be exercised as to each class member individually, or (2) the class 
is of the “purely representational variety.”282  Judge Wood argued that 
23(b)(3) classes that involve too many differences among the individual 
members—such as differences in “interest, stake, or motivation”283—
conform more squarely to the joinder model, that is, the model in which 
several individuals use Rule 20 (or a state equivalent) to aggregate their 
claims, as was the case in Bristol-Myers.284  However, classes that involve 
these differences should not, with the proper scrutiny, be able to obtain class 
certification in the first place.  Nevertheless, if they do obtain certification, 
due to a lack of scrutiny or difficulty in ascertaining predominance at the 
filing stage, there are ex post measures to remedy the error.285 
Either way, the case remains that a group of individuals with a mass tort 
claim against a particular defendant cannot simply circumvent the personal 
jurisdiction obstacle created by Bristol-Myers by proceeding as a class.  To 
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do so would require the group to satisfy the predominance requirement.286  
And, as already explained, the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers-like actions are not 
able to do so.287  Indeed, “the predominance requirement . . . precludes 
certification in most mass tort personal injury cases.”288  Thus, the 
predominance requirement has the effect of distinguishing the actual nature 
of money-damage mass actions and money-damage class actions.  Failing to 
extend Bristol-Myers, then, facilitates realization of 23(b)(3)’s objective:  to 
enable a certain type of group to proceed through representative litigation—
more specifically, a group that is defined by predominantly the same issues 
of law and fact. 
Finally, class actions, unlike mass actions, are governed by a rule that was 
created to establish an equitable exception to the constitutional limitation of 
individuals being bound only by actions to which they are a party in the 
traditional sense (i.e., a named party).289  Mass actions, conversely, comport 
with this constitutional limitation.290  The very core of a class action, then, is 
constitutionally exceptional.  Thus, to except class actions from the 
federalism language of Bristol-Myers seems justifiable. 
In Amchem, which involved a putative 23(b)(3) class action, the Court 
noted that Rule 23(b)’s “dominant concern” is ensuring that “the proposed 
class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by 
decisions of class representatives.”291  If a court certifies a class, then, it 
inherently acknowledges the group’s unique level of cohesiveness.  Seen 
another way, similar to the mootness exception, this due process exception is 
not genuinely exceptional, but rather consistent with the notion that classes 
are properly perceived as individual units and, thus, the absent class members 
are fully present through their representatives.  An injury to any individual in 
the class represents an injury to a portion of the class itself.  Accordingly, if 
the class representative satisfies the jurisdictional requirements, so do the 
absent class members. 
Yet the Court has made clear that in 23(b)(3) actions this due process 
concern is significant.292  However, this concern is addressed through 
23(b)(3)’s provision of a middle ground:  rather than require individuals to 
affirmatively opt into the action (as due process would mandate in any other 
type of nonclass action), absent class members must be given the opportunity 
to affirmatively opt out.293  This middle ground can only be regarded as 
constitutionally appropriate if 23(b)(3) classes are sufficiently cohesive and 
representational; if they are, a court’s jurisdictional reach over the absentees 
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will be a function of its reach over the representative before it.  The 
predominance requirement achieves this aim.  In sum, while the 
predominance requirement might not rise to the level of awarding 23(b)(3) 
classes with the same “entity” status as the other types of class action, it does 
enough to protect it from Bristol-Myers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bristol-Myers Court was clear about the contours of the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine and how it applied to the facts at hand.  The non-
Californian plaintiffs could not survive a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction because general jurisdiction could not be asserted over 
BMS, and the non-Californian plaintiffs’ claims did not arise out of BMS’s 
contacts with California.  To hold otherwise, the Court emphasized, would 
infringe upon the sovereignty of the states that did represent an appropriate 
forum for the non-California residents.  The Court, as Justice Sotomayor 
crossly noted, left open the question of whether its decision would extend to 
class actions.  Thus, this Note principally examined whether class actions are 
sufficiently distinguishable from mass actions so that the Court’s federalism 
concern is not implicated.  For 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) actions, the answer 
came more easily:  the unified and essential nature of these actions precluded 
extension of Bristol-Myers.  Rule 23(b)(3) actions, on the other hand, 
presented a closer question.  However, the requirements that are needed to 
form 23(b)(3) classes, namely, the predominance and superiority 
requirements, elevate 23(b)(3) classes above Bristol-Myers’s reach.  Without 
them, 23(b)(3) actions would be too similar to mass actions to survive 
Bristol-Myers.  Similar to how they permit a middle ground to satisfy due 
process concerns, these unifying requirements do enough to evade Bristol-
Myers concerns as well.  Perhaps a middle ground in this context as well is 
imminent.  For now, though, the class action should remain unscathed. 
